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Abstract—Large data sets are increasingly common in cloud
and virtualized environments. For example, transfers of multiple
gigabytes are commonplace, as are replicated blocks of such sizes.
There is a need for fast error-correction or data reconciliation in
such settings even when the expected number of errors is small.
Motivated by such cloud reconciliation problems, we consider
error-correction schemes designed for large data, after explaining
why previous approaches appear unsuitable. We introduce Biff
codes, which are based on Bloom filters and are designed for
large data. For Biff codes with a message of length L and E
errors, the encoding time is O(L), decoding time is O(L + E)
and the space overhead is O(E). Biff codes are low-density parity-
check codes; they are similar to Tornado codes, but are designed
for errors instead of erasures. Further, Biff codes are designed
to be very simple, removing any explicit graph structures and
based entirely on hash tables. We derive Biff codes by a simple
reduction from a set reconciliation algorithm for a recently
developed data structure, invertible Bloom lookup tables. While
the underlying theory is extremely simple, what makes this code
especially attractive is the ease with which it can be implemented
and the speed of decoding. We present results from a prototype
implementation that decodes messages of 1 million words with
thousands of errors in well under a second.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the frequent need to transfer and reconcile
large data sets in virtualized and cloud environments, we
provide a very simple and fast error-correcting code designed
for very large data streams. For example, consider the specific
problem of reconciling two memories of 2 Gbytes whose
contents may differ by a small number of 32-bit words.
Alternatively, one can picture transferring a memory of this
size, and needing to check for errors after it is written to the
new storage. We assume errors are mutation errors; data order
remains intact.
Other possible applications include deduplication, as ex-
emplified by the Difference Engine [6]. While storage may
seem cheap, great cost savings can be effected by replacing
redundant copies of data with a single copy and pointers in
other locations. For example, in virtualized environments, it
is not surprising that two virtual machines might have virtual
memories with a great deal of redundancy. For example, both
VMs may include similar copies of the operating system. More
generally, we are concerned with any setting with large data
transfers over networks.
In this setting, our primary notion of efficiency differs
somewhat from standard coding. While we still want the re-
dundancy added for the code to be as small as possible, speed
appears to be a more important criterion for large data sets. In
particular, for a message of length L and E errors, while we
may want close to the minimum overhead of E words, O(E)
words with a reasonably small constant should suffice. More
importantly, we require very fast encoding and decoding times;
encoding should be O(L) and decoding should be O(L+E),
with very small constant factors implied in the asymptotic
notation. Typically, E will be very small compared to L; we
expect very small error rates, or even subconstant error rates
(such as a bounded number of errors).
In this paper, we describe new codes that are designed
for large data. We also show why other approaches (such
as Reed-Solomon Codes or Tornado codes with with block-
based checksum) are unsuitable. Our codes are extremely
attractive from the point of view of engineering effectiveness:
our software prototype implementation is very fast, decoding
messages of 1 million words with thousands of errors in under
a second.
We call our codes Biff codes, where Biff denotes how we
pronounce BF, for Bloom filter. Biff codes are motivated by
recent Bloom filter variations, the invertible Bloom filter [3]
and invertible Bloom lookup table [5], and their uses for set
reconciliation [4], as explained below. Alternatively, Biff codes
are similar to Tornado codes [1], [9], and can be viewed as a
practical, randomized low-density parity-check code with an
especially simple structure designed specifically for word-level
mutation errors. Also, while Tornado codes were designed
using multiple levels of random graphs with carefully chosen
degree distributions, Biff codes reduce this structure to its
barest elements; our basic structure is single-layer, and regular,
in that each message symbol takes part in the same number of
encoded symbols. As a result, programming efficient encoding
and decoding routines can easily be done in a matter of hours.
We expect this simplicity will be prized as a virtue in practical
settings; indeed, we believe Biff codes reflect the essential
ideas behind other related low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes, in their simplest form.
We also provide a simple (and apparently new) general
reduction from error correcting codes to set reconciliation.
While reductions from erasure and error correcting codes to
set reconciliation are well known [7], [10], our reduction may
be useful independent of Biff Codes.
Finally, a related approach for reconciliation, focused on the
setting of data streams, appears in [14].
II. FROM SET RECONCILIATION TO ERROR CORRECTING
OMISSION ERRORS
We now describe how to construct Biff codes from invertible
Bloom lookup tables (IBLTs). The source of the stream of
ideas we exploit is a seminal paper called Invertible Bloom
Filters by Eppstein and Goodrich that invented a streaming
data structure for the so-called straggler problem [3]. The
basic idea was generalized for set reconciliation by Eppstein,
Goodrich, Uyeda, and Varghese in [4] and generalized and
improved further by Goodrich and Mitzenmacher to IBLTs [5].
We choose to use the framework of IBLTs in the exposition
that follows though we could have used the set difference
algorithm in [4] instead.
We start by reviewing the main aspects of IBLTs that we
require from [5]. We note that we do not require the full IBLT
structure for our application, so we discuss only the elements
that we need, and refer readers to [5] for further details on
IBLT performance.
A. IBLTs via Hashing
Our IBLT construction uses a table T of m cells, and a
set of k random hash functions, h1, h2, . . ., hk, to store
a collection of key-value pairs. In our setting, keys will be
distinct, and each key will have a value determined by the
key. On an insertion, each key-value pair is placed into cells
T [h1(x)], T [h2(x)], . . . T [hk(x)]. We assume the hash func-
tions are fully random (hash values independent and uniformly
distributed); in practice this assumption appears suitable (see,
e.g., [11], [13] for related work on this point). For technical
reasons, we assume that distinct hash functions yield distinct
locations. This can be accomplished in various ways, such as
by splitting the m cells into k subtables each of size m/k, and
having each hash function choose one cell (uniformly) from
each subtable. Such splitting does not affect the asymptotic
behavior in our analysis.
In a standard IBLT, each cell contains three fields: a keySum
field, which is the exclusive-or (XOR) of all the keys that
have been inserted that map to this cell; a valueSum field,
which is the XOR of all the values of the keys that have been
inserted that map to this cell; and a count field, which counts
the number of keys that have been inserted into the cell.
As all operations are XORs, deletions are handled in an
equivalent manner: on deletion of a previously inserted key-
value pair, the IBLT XORs the key and value with the fields in
the appropriate cells, and the count is reversed. This reverses
a corresponding insertion. We will discuss later how to deal
with deletions without corresponding insertions, a case that
can usefully occur in our setting.
B. Listing Set Entries
We now consider how to list the entries of the IBLT. The
approach is straightforward. We do a first pass through the
cells to find cells with a count of 1, and construct a list of
those cells. We recover the key and corresponding value from
this cell, and then delete the corresponding pair from the table.
In the course of performing deletions, we check the count of
the relevant cells. If a cell’s count becomes 1, we add it to the
list; if it drops from 1 to 0, we can remove it from the list.
This approach can easily be implemented O(m) time.
If at the end of this process all the cells have a count of
0, then we have succeeded in recovering all the entries in the
IBLT. Otherwise, the method only outputs a partial list of the
key-value pairs in B.
k 3 4 5 6 7
ck 1.222 1.295 1.425 1.570 1.721
TABLE I
THRESHOLDS FOR THE 2-CORE ROUNDED TO FOUR DECIMAL PLACES.
This “peeling process” is well known in the context of
random graphs and hypergraphs as the process used to find
the 2-core of a random hypergraph (e.g., see [2], [12]). This
peeling process is similarly used for various codes, including
Tornado codes and their derivatives (e.g., see [9]). Previous
results therefore give tight thresholds: when the number of
hash values k for each pair is at least 2 and there are n key-
value pairs in the IBLT, there are constants ck > 1 such that
if m > (ck + ǫ)n for any constant ǫ > 0, the listing process
succeeds with probability 1−o(1); similarly, if m < (ck−ǫ)n
for any constant ǫ > 0, the listing process fails with probability
1− o(1). As shown in [2], [12], these values are given by
c−1k = sup
{
α : 0 < α < 1; ∀x ∈ (0, 1), 1− e−kαxk−1 < x
}
.
Numerical values for k ≥ 3 are given in Table I.
The choice of k affects the probability of the listing process
failing. By choosing k sufficiently large and m above the
2-core threshold, standard results give that the bottleneck
is the possibility of having two key-value pairs with the
same collection of hash values, giving a failure probability
of O(m−k+2).
We note that, with some additional effort, there are various
ways to save space with the IBLT structure that are known in
the literature. including using compressed arrays, quotienting,
and irregular constructions (where different keys can utilize a
different number of hash values, as in irregular LDPC codes).
In practice the constant factors are small, and such approaches
may interfere with the simplicity we aim for with the IBLT
approach; we therefore do not consider them further here.
C. Set Reconciliation with IBLTs
We consider two users, Alice and Bob, referred to as A and
B. Suppose Alice and Bob hold distinct but similar sets of
keys, and they would like to reconcile the differences. This
is the well known set reconciliation problem. To achieve such
a reconciliation with low overhead [4], Alice constructs an
IBLT. The value associated with each key is a fingerprint (or
checksum) obtained from the key. In what follows, we assume
the value is taken by hashing the key, yielding an uniform
value over all b-bit values for an appropriate b, and that the
hash function is shared between Alice and Bob. Alice sends
Bob her IBLT, and he correspondingly deletes from the IBLT
the key-value pairs from his set.
In this setting, when Bob deletes a key-value pair not held
by Alice, it is possible for a cell count to become negative.
The remaining key-value pairs left in the IBLT correspond
exactly to items that exactly one of Alice or Bob has. Bob
can use the IBLT structure to recover these pairs efficiently.
For lack of space, we present the argument informally; the
IBLT properties we use were formally derived in [5].
We first note that, in this setting, because deletions may
reduce the count of cells, it is possible that a cell can have
a count of 1 but not contain exactly one key-value pair. For
example, if two pairs are inserted by Alice into a cell, and
Bob deletes a pair that does not match Alice’s in that cell,
the count will be 1. Hence, in this setting, the proper way
to check if a cell contains a valid pair is to test that the
checksum for the keySum field matches the valueSum. In fact,
because the value corresponds to a checksum, the count field
is extraneous. (It can be a useful additional check, but strictly
is unnecessary. Moreover, it may not be space-effective; since
the counts will depend on the number of items inserted, not
on the size of the difference between the sets.) Instead, the list
of cells that allow us to recover a value in our listing process
are determined by a match of the key and checksum value.
Importantly, because Bob’s deletion operation is symmetric to
Alice’s insertion operation, this holds true for cells containing
a pair deleted by Bob as well as cells containing a pair inserted
by Alice. (In this case, the corresponding count, if used, should
be −1 for cells with a deleted pair.)
Bob can therefore use the IBLT to recover these pairs effi-
ciently. (Strictly speaking, Bob need only recover Alice’s keys,
but this simplification does not make a noticeable difference
in our context.) If ∆ is an upper bound on the number of keys
not shared between Alice and Bob, then from the argument
sketched above, an IBLT with only O(∆) cells is necessary,
with the constant factor dependent on the success probability
desired.
III. ERROR-CORRECTING CODES WITH IBLTS
We now show how to use the above scheme to obtain
a computationally efficient error-correcting code. Our error-
correcting code can be viewed as a reduction using set recon-
ciliation. Let B have a message for A corresponding to the se-
quence of values x1, x2, . . . , xn. Then B sends A the message
along with set reconciliation information – in our case, the
IBLT – for the set of ordered pairs (x1, 1), (x2, 2), . . . , (xn, n).
For now we assume the set reconciliation information A
obtains is without error; errors only occur in message values.
When A obtains the sequence y1, y2, . . . , yn, she constructs
her own set of pairs (y1, 1), (y2, 2), . . . , (yn, n), and recon-
ciles the two sets to find erroneous positions. Notice that
this approach requires random symbol errors as opposed to
adversarial errors for our IBLT approach, as we require the
checksums to accurately determine when key-value pairs are
valid. However, there are standard approaches that overcome
this problem that would make it suitable for adversarial errors
with a suitably limited adversary (by applying a pseudo-
random permutation on the symbols that is secret from the
adversary; see, for example, [8]). Also, the positions of the
errors can be anywhere in the message (as long as the positions
are chosen independently of the method used to generate the
set reconciliation information).
If there are no errors in the data for the IBLT structure, then
this reduction can be directly applied. However, assuming the
IBLT is sent over the same channel as the data, then some cells
in the IBLT will have erroneous keySum or valueSum fields. If
errors are randomly distributed and the error rate is sufficiently
small, this is not a concern; as shown in [5], IBLT listing is
quite robust against errors in the IBLT structure. Specifically,
an error will cause the keySum and valueSum fields of an IBLT
cell not to match, and as such it will not be used for decoding;
this can be problematic if all the cells hashed to an erroneous
message cell are themselves in error, as the value cannot then
be recovered, but under appropriate parameter settings this will
be rare in practice. As a summary, using the 1-layer scheme,
where errors can occur in the IBLT, the main contribution to
the failure probability is when an erroneous symbol suffers
from all k of its hash locations in the IBLT being in error. If
z is the fraction of IBLT cells in error, the expected number
of such symbols is Ezk, and the distribution of such failures
is binomial (and approximately Poisson, when the expectation
is small). Hence, when such errors occur, there is usually only
one of them, and instead of using recursive error correction on
the IBLT one could instead use a very small amount of error
correction in the original message.
For bursty errors or other error models, we may need to
randomly intersperse the IBLT structure with the original
message; note, however, that the randomness used in hashing
the message values protects us from bursty errors over the
message.
Basic pseudocode for encoding and decoding of Biff codes
is given below (using C-style notation in places); the code
is very simple, and is written entirely in terms of hash table
operations.
• ENCODE
for i = 1 . . . n do
for j = 1 . . . k do
Tj[hj((xi, i))].keySum ˆ= (xi, i).
Tj[hj((xi, i))].valueSum ˆ= Check((xi, i)).
• DECODE
for i = 1 . . . n do
for j = 1 . . . k do
Tj[hj((yi, i))].keySum ˆ= (yi, i).
Tj[hj((yi, i))].valueSum ˆ= Check((yi, i)).
while ∃ a, j with (Tj[a].keySum 6= 0) and
(Tj [a].valueSum == Check(Tj [a].keySum)) do
(z, i) = Tj[a].keySum
if z 6= yi then
set yi to z when decoding terminates
for j = 1 . . . k do
Tj[hj((z, i))].keySum ˆ= (z, i).
Tj[hj((z, i))].valueSum ˆ= Check((z, i)).
In our pseudocode, there is some leeway in how one im-
plements the while statement. One natural implementation
would keep a list (such as a linked list) of pairs a, j that
satisfy the conditions. This list can be initialized by a walk
through the arrays, and then updated as the while loop modifies
the contents of the table. The total work will clearly be
proportional to the size of the tables, which will be O(E)
when the table size is chosen appropriately.
We may also recursively apply a further IBLT, treating the
first IBLT as data, or we can use a more expensive error-
correcting code, such as a Reed-Solomon code, to protect the
much smaller IBLT. This approach is similar to that used under
the original scheme for Tornado codes, but appears unneces-
sary for many natural error models. For ease of exposition, we
assume random locations for errors henceforth.
The resulting error-correcting code is not space-optimal, but
the overhead in terms of the space required for the error-
correction information is small when the error-rate is small.
If there are e errors, then there will be 2e key-value pairs in
the IBLT; the overhead with having 3, 4, or 5 choices, as seen
from Table I, will then correspond to less than 3e cells. Each
cell contains both a keySum or valueSum, each of which will
be (depending on the implementation) roughly the same size
as the original key. Note here the key in our setting includes
a position as well as the original message symbol, so this is
additional overhead. Putting these together, we can expect that
the error-correction overhead is roughly a factor of 6 over the
optimal amount of overhead, which would be e times the size
of a message symbol.
While this is a non-trivial price, it is important to place
it in context. For large keys, with a 1% error rate, even an
optimal code for a message of length M bytes would require
at least (1/0.99)M ≈ 1.01M bytes to be sent, and a standard
Reed-Solomon code (correcting E errors with 2E additional
values) would require at least 1.02M bytes. Biff codes would
require about 1.06M bytes. The resulting advantages, again,
are simplicity and speed. We expect that in many engineering
contexts, the advantages of the IBLT approach will outweigh
the small additional space cost.
For very large messages, parallelization can speed things
up further; key-value pairs can be inserted or deleted in
parallel easily, with the bottleneck being atomic writes when
XORing into a cell. The listing step also offers opportunities
for parallelization, with threads being based on cells, and cells
becoming active when their checksum value matches the key.
We don’t explore parallelization further here, but we note the
simple, regular framework at the heart of Biff codes.
We also note that, naturally, the approach of using IBLTs
can be applied to design a simple erasure-correcting code. This
corresponds to a set reconciliation problem where one set is
slightly larger than the other; nothing is inserted at A’s end
for missing elements. Other error models may also be handled
using the same technique.
IV. ISSUES WITH OTHER APPROACHES
Other natural approaches fail to have both fast encoding and
decoding, and maintain O(E) overhead. While asymptotically
faster algorithms exist, the computational overhead of Reed-
Solomon codes is generally Θ(EL) in practice, making a
straightforward implementation infeasible in this setting, once
the number of errors is non-trivial. Breaking the data into
blocks and encoding each would be ineffective with bursty
errors. One could randomly permute the message data before
breaking it into blocks, to randomize the position of errors
and thereby spread them among blocks. In practice, however,
taking a large memory block and then permuting it is ex-
tremely expensive as it destroys natural data locality. Once a
memory or disk page is read it is almost “free” to read the
remaining words in sequence; randomizing positions becomes
hugely expensive. (By contrast, the method we suggested
to make Biff more resilient to adversarial errors does not
destroy locality because it randomizes over symbol values, not
positions.) Finally, there are issues in finding a suitable field
size to compute over, particularly for large messages.
The problems we describe above are not original; similar
discussions, for example, appear with the early work on
Tornado codes [1]. Experiments comparing Reed-Solomon
codes for erasures with Tornado codes from the original paper
demonstrate that Reed-Solomon codes are orders of magnitude
slower at this scale.
An alternative approach is to use Tornado codes (or similar
LDPC codes) directly, using checksums to ensure that suitably
sized blocks are accurate. For example, we could divide the
message of length L into L/B blocks of B symbols and add
an error-detection checksum of c bits to each block. If we
assume blocks with detected errors are dropped, then E errors
could result in EB symbols being dropped, requiring the code
to send at least an additional kEB bits for a suitably small
constant k. The total overhead would then be Lc/B + kEB;
simple calculus yields the minimum overhead is when B =
2
√
ckLE, with block sizes of O(
√
L/E) and resulting space
overhead of O(
√
LE).
On the other hand, for Biff codes the redundancy overhead is
O(E) with small constants hidden in the O notation, because
only the values in the cells of the hash table, and not the
original data, require checksums. This is a key benefit of
the Biff code approach; only the hash table cells need to be
protected with checksums.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to test our approach, we have implemented Biff
codes in software. Our code uses pseudorandom hash values
generated from the C drand function (randomly seeded using
the clock), and therefore our timing information does not
include the time to hash. However, we point out that hashing
is unlikely to be a major bottleneck. For example, even if for
each one wants 4 hash locations for each key into 4 subtables
of size 1024, and an additional 24 bit hash for the checksum
for each key, all the necessary values can be obtained with a
single 64-bit hash operation.
Setup: Our has table is split into k equal subtables. As
mentioned, to determine locations in each subtable, we use
pseudorandom hash values. For convenience we use random
20 bit keys as our original message symbols and 20 bits to
describe the location in the sequence. While these keys are
small, it allows us to do all computation with 64-bit operations.
For a checksum, we use a simple invertible function: the pair
(xi, i) gives a checksum of (2i+ 1) ∗ xi + i2.
One standard test case uses 1 million 20-bit message sym-
bols and an IBLT of 30000 cells, with errors introduced in
10000 message symbols and 600 IBLT cells. Note that with
only 20 bit keys and 20 bits to record the length, an IBLT cell
is actually 4 times the size of a message cell (so our IBLT is
2400000 bits); however, we use a 2% error rate in the IBLT
as we expect message symbols will generally be much longer.
For example, in practice a key might be a 1KB packet, in
which case 1 million message symbols would correspond to a
gigabyte.
Timing: Our results show Biff codes to be extremely fast.
There are two decoding stages, as can be seen in the previously
given pseudocode. First, the received sequence values must
be placed into the hash table. Second, the hash table must
be processed and the erroneous values recovered. Generally,
the bulk of the work will actually be in the first stage, when
the number of errors are small. We had to utilize messages
of 1 million symbols in order to obtain suitable timing
data; otherwise processing was too fast. On our standard test
case over 1000 trials, using 4 hash functions the first stage
took 0.0561 seconds on average and the second took 0.0069
seconds on average. With 5 hash functions, the numbers were
0.0651 second and 0.0078 seconds.
Thresholds: Our threshold calculations are very accurate. For
example, in a setting where no errors are introduced in the
IBLT, with 4 hash functions and 10000 errors we would expect
to require approximately 26000 cells in order to recover fully.
(Recall that 10000 errors means 20000 keys are placed into the
IBLT.) Our experiments yielded that with and IBLT of 26000
cells, complete recovery occurred in 803 out of 1000 trials;
for 26500 cells, complete recovery occurred in 10000 out of
10000 trials.
Failure probabilities: We have purposely chosen parameters
that would lead to failures, in order to check our analysis.
Under our standard test case with four hash functions, we
estimate the probability of failure during any single trial as
10000 · (600/30000)4 = 1.6 × 10−3. Over an experiment
with 10000 trials, we indeed found 16 trials with failures,
and in each failure, there was just one unrecovered erroneous
message symbol. Reducing to 500 errors in the IBLT reduces
the failure probability to 10000 · (500/30000)4 ≈ 7.7× 10−4;
an experiment with 10000 trials led to a seven failures, each
with just one unrecovered erroneous message symbol. Finally,
with 5 hash functions and 600 IBLT errors, we would estimate
the failure probability as 10000 · (600/30000)5 = 3.2× 10−5;
a run of 10000 trials yielded no failures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our goal was to design an error-correcting code that would
be extremely fast and simple for use in networking applications
such as large-scale data transfer and reconciliation in cloud
computing systems. While not optimal in terms of rate, the
amount of redundancy used is a small constant factor more
than optimal; we expect this will be suitable for many appli-
cations, given the other advantages. Although we have focused
on error correction of large data, Biff codes may also be
useful for smaller messages, in settings where computational
efficiency is paramount and where small block sizes were
introduced at least partially to reduce Reed-Solomon decoding
overheads.
We note that in the large data setting we can adapt the
sampling technique described in [4] to estimate the number
of errors E in O(logL) time with an error bound that is
quantified in Theorem 2 of [4]. This allows the Biff code to be
sized correctly to O(E) without requiring any a priori bound
on E to be known in advance. For example, when two large
virtual memories are to be reconciled it is difficult to have a
reasonable bound on the number of errors or differences. In the
communications setting this is akin to estimating the channel
error rate and adapting the code. However, such error rate
estimation in the communication setting is done infrequently
to reduce overhead. In our large data setting, the cost of
estimation is so cheap that it can be done on each large data
reconciliation.
Finally, we note that modern low-density parity-check codes
are sufficiently complex that they are difficult to teach without
without going through a number of preliminaries. By contrast,
Biff codes are sufficiently simple that we believe they could
be taught in an introductory computer science class, and
even introductory level programmers could implement them.
Beyond their practical applications, Biff codes might prove
worthwhile as a gateway to modern coding techniques.
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